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Abstract
This paper assesses the significance of financing constraints in investment decisions for a balanced
panel of 206 of the largest Dutch manufacturing firms over the period 1983-1996, employing split
sample analysis of reduced form investment equations. Our empirical evidence demonstrates that
financing constraints matter in Dutch manufacturing and are associated with high retention
practice and strong firm-industry sales comovement.
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1 Introduction
Liquidation is costly. The exact cost of liquidation, however, depends on whom you can sell your
assets to when you are forced to liquidate. Firms in the same line of business are the next best
users of the assets. Hence, the liquidation cost is lowest when it is possible to sell the assets to a
firm in the same business. If firm and industry sales are highly correlated, which by definition
implies a high degree of comovement, then the firm and industry face declining demand at the
same time and the liquidation value of assets is expected to be low. In that case other firms in the
same line of business are likely to face difficulties in generating financial resources themselves to
purchase the second-hand capital assets of their competitors or find no interest in expanding their
business. Therefore, the probability that a firm is able to sell its assets to a firm in the same line of
business – and hence the liquidation value of these assets – decreases with a higher degree of
comovement of the firm and industry sales (cf. Shleifer and Vishny, 1992). 
The contribution of this paper is that we investigate whether a firm’s ability to finance
investment depends on the degree of comovement of the firm and industry sales. The underlying
idea is as follows. Debt capacity and the firm’s ability to finance investment increases if the firm
can provide collateral to a bank underlying a loan. Obviously the extent to which a firm can
provide collateral depends on the liquidation value of the assets, which increases with better
possibilities to resell the capital stock. Hence, it is likely that debt capacity increases with a high
liquidation value and that the amount of collateralized loans such firms can generate tend to be
higher. In line with Hubbard (1998) we regard these collateralized loans to be a close substitute of
internal funds. Firms that are not able to resell their capital stock at favourable terms and therefore
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face low liquidation values are more likely to engage in uncollateralized loans.  We expect that
these firms are more likely to face financing constraints. 
The empirical literature on corporate financing constraints has received substantial attention
since the seminal contribution of Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988). The importance of
financing constraints for investment decisions emerges from the fact that different sources of
finance are differently priced. Well-known factors causing variation in the cost of funds are the
presence of transaction costs, taxes and information problems, indicating that capital markets are
incomplete and far from frictionless. The cost differences lead to a financing hierarchy for firms. In
fact, it is hypothesized that managers of firms prefer funding investment with retained earnings
over debt finance, and prefer debt over equity. An overview of the literature on the role of
financing constraints is provided by Hubbard (1998). 
This paper investigates the role of financing constraints in Dutch corporate investment in the
manufacturing sector. We estimate reduced form investment equations augmented with variables
that capture the importance of financing constraints. Along these lines one may think of changes in
internal funds (cash flow) and working capital investment. We hypothesize first and foremost that
investment is not systematically driven by cash flow for firms that face no financing constraints.
When financing constraints are binding, however, we do expect a systematic and positive cash
flow impact on investment. Thus we arrive at the workhorse in this field of study and estimate
investment equations for subsamples of firms which are a priori classified as facing binding or non-
binding financing contraints. We apply this methodology to a sample of 206 large and mature
Dutch firms for which relevant data are available covering the period 1983-1996.
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We employ two splitting criteria to distinguish between different subsamples of firms. The
first is based on retention practice, as in Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988). This well-known
scheme classifies firms into different groups of observed retention practice. It is argued that firms
in the high retention regime are more likely to face financing constraints than those in the low
retention regime. The second is an indicator of the liquidation value of investment and is based on
industry comovement of sales  (cf. Guiso and Parigi, 1999). This classification scheme takes into
account that financing constraints may also be industry-specific, rather than only firm-specific. So
far relatively few studies have addressed whether financing constraints are affected by particular
features of the industry a firm is operating in. Relevant contributions in this respect are Schaller
(1993) and Chirinko and Schaller (1995) using a sample of Canadian firms and Weigand and
Audretsch (1999) with data on German firms.
Our main empirical findings are the following. First, we find that cash flow does not
significantly impact on investment in the full-sample estimation of the investment equation. The
same result is obtained for the subsample of a priori unconstrained firms. These results are found
by very few studies. Second, in contrast to Van Ees and Garretsen (1994) we find that retention
practice effectively distinguishes between financially constrained and unconstrained firms in our
Dutch sample. That is, high retention firms have stronger cash flow (and also working capital and
bank loan accumulation) sensitivities of investment than low retention firms. This indicates that
these firms are more likely to face binding financing constraints. Third, we find that the probability
of costly liquidation is related to stricter financing constraints: high comovement of sales is
associated with binding financing constraints.
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The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 develops a dynamic investment model in the
absence of financing constraints. Section 3 introduces and discusses the role of financing
constraints into our investment model. Section 4 depicts the estimation procedure. Section 5
presents the data used and constructs the sample splitting criteria. Empirical results are presented
and discussed in section 6. Section 7 concludes.
2 The basic investment equation
We start by considering the corporate investment decision in the absence of financing constraints 
In characterizing the investment equation we aim at keeping it empirically tractable while at the
same time attempting to model investment sufficiently comprehensive. We aim to achieve this by
selection of specific functional forms for dynamic investment.
We have chosen to develop an empirical specification of dynamic investment in line with
Bond and Van Reenen (1999). This approach takes into account that capital stock adjustment is
costly and takes time, yet refrains from explicitly modelling complex adjustment (cost) technology.
In fact in this setup investment dynamics are determined by an autoregressive distributed lag
(ADL) characterization of capital accumulation.
For the ADL (1, 1) model:
(1)ln ( ) ln ( ) ln ( ) ln ( )* *k k k kt t t t= + +− −α β β1 1 0 1 1
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where  is the actual (targeted) capital stock at time t. Under the long run proportionalityk t(* )
constraint, , we can subtract  from both sides of (1), substitute for  in (1) and( )β βα0 111 1+− = ln ( )k t −1 β0
arrive at an investment demand function of the following form:
. (2)∆ ∆ln ( ) ln ( ) ( ) ( ln ( ) ln ( ) )* *k k k kt t t t= − + − − −β α1 1 11
Note that  is defined as . In order to implement this framework as an∆ ln ( )(* )k t ln( )(*)k t − −ln ( )(* )k t 1
error correction mechanism, we need to specify the optimal capital stock . We do so byk *
considering a production function in which capital  (k) is the only factor to produce output (Y) and
output is a linear function of capital imputs:
, (3)Y F k kt t K t= =( ) α
where K > 0. In addition, we assume a sufficient degree of monopolistic competition to ensure a
downward sloping demand function for output:
(4)p B Yt t D= −
1
η
where B is a demand shift parameter and  implies a price elastic demand for output. Theη D > 1
static optimal capital demand is obtained from the following simple maximization problem:
1 Please note that Bond and Van Reenen (1999) derive a very similar first order condition for capital
from a more comprehensive specification of the production function (constant elasticity of substitution
characterization of production with labour as an additional factor of production). Here too, our simplified
representation of the production process does not lead to loss of generality.
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where  is the (exogenous) rental price of capital. The solution to this maximization problem isrt
the static optimal capital stock , which in the present setup may be interpreted as long run ork t*
desired capital stock:
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This gives a log-linear representation for , as shown in equation (7).k t*
 (7)( )ln ( ) ln ln ( ) ln*k Yt t rp
t
D= −
  + −1 1η
Simple substitution of equation (7) into equation (2) gives us the dynamic investment equation
(8)( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )∆ ∆ ∆ln ( ) ln ln ( ) ln ln ( ) ln ( ) ln .k Y Y kt t rp
t
t t
r
p
t
D= − −
  − − + − − − −−1 1 1 11 1 1 1 1 1 1α β β α αη
2 Our investment model does not include Tobin’s Q. One reason we have chosen this framework is that
we have no information concerning the market value of equity, so that we are not able to measure Tobin’s Q.
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We use equation (8) as our basic investment equation. In the absence of financing constraints we
expect the variables in (8) to be sufficient statistics for the determination of investment. This
characterization is simple, yet explicitly allows for a role of complex adjustment processes and
adjustment cost technologies through use of the ADL specification. Our investment equation is
essentially neo-classical in format as it includes a measure of sales or output and a cost of capital
measure.2
3 Financing constraints
So far we have discussed the investment decision separate from the financing decision. This is
justified under the assumption of a perfect capital market so that the irrelevance theorem holds and
firms invest according to equation (8) above. However, financing becomes non-trivial in the
investment decision when firms face binding financing constraints so that they take into account
additional factors that were not included in equation (8), such as the availability of internal funds.
We define binding financing constraints according to Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1996; p. 4,
footnote 1) as “conditions that raise the cost of external finance (debt or equity) above the
opportunity cost of internal finance”. We illustrate the impact of binding financing constraints on
investment in figure 1 by considering a static investment decision. The figure shows three
negatively sloped investment demand functions (II, III, IIII) and one supply schedule for finance. The
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latter schedule is initially flat and indicates that internal funds are available at the opportunity cost
of internal finance which is assumed constant. External finance is more expensive. In particular,
the marginal cost of finance rises with increasing use of debt and is highest (but constant) for new
equity issues.
The cost of external funds may be raised above the opportunity cost of internal finance for
two major reasons. First, new equity issues may carry an equity and/or lemon’s premium. The
lemon’s premium may vary between firms depending on how well-informed investors are about
the firm. In general, however, the lemon’s premium on equity is assumed to be unrelated to the
amount of equity outstanding (cf. Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen, 1988). Therefore, in figure 1 the
slope of the cost of funds in the regime where new equity is issued is flat. Second, debt may carry
a default premium. The default risk premium on debt is not unrelated to the size of the debt
burden. In fact, the very first increments to debt are nearly risk-free. Therefore, at low levels of
debt, its cost hardly exceeds the opportunity cost of internal finance. When leverage increases,
however, lending to the firm becomes more risky from the lender’s point of view. This may be due
to, for example, a rising risk of default or lack of collateral (Hubbard, 1998). The cost of debt
therefore increases with the amount of debt outstanding. Therefore, in figure 1 the slope of the
cost of funds in the regime where new debt is accumulated is positive.
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
As figure 1 shows, this setup results in firms financing investment according to a financing
hierarchy. Whenever internal funds are available, firms will use these funds first. For those cases
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where internal funds are sufficient to meet required investment (at an investment demand II in
figure 1) this suffices. In this situation we say that firms operate in financing regime I. When
investment demand exceeds internal funds, but not sufficiently so to justify new equity issues (at
investment demand III in the figure), firms finance with a mix of internal funds and debt. We call
this financing regime II. At investment demand as strong as IIII using all internal funds and
borrowing up to a debt level that equates the cost of new debt with that of new equity does not
suffice to finance investment. Now the firm additionally has to raise new equity. We label this
financing regime III.
Whenever the firm has investment demand relative to internal funds such that it operates in
either regime II or III, it faces binding financing constraints. Binding financing constraints imply
that investment would increase if the firm could replace externally generated sources of funds by
internal financial resources. In a dynamic context, we can observe from figure 1 that firms in
financing regime I have no incentive to increase investment when internal funds become available
in future time periods, but firms in regimes II and III do have this incentive. Hence if financing
constraints are relevant and the firm operates in financing regime II or III, investment is sensitive
to changes in internal funds. All else equal, the sensitivity of investment to internal financial
resources in regime II depends on the steepness of the debt supply curve. Firms operating in
regime III also have an incentive to increase investment if internal financial resources increase.
Due to the higher cost of external finance these firms have invested less than they would have in
case enough internal financial resources had been available. In other words their desired capital
stock (KIII, *) is higher than their actual capital stock (KIII).
3 This is a familiar result from the real options literature, where uncertainty reduces the willingness to
invest now as opposed to waiting to see which projects are really worthwhile. Financing constraints reduce the
number of projects a firm can invest in and hence increase the payoff to knowing for sure which projects are going
to be the real winners (see van de Laar and Letterie, 2001).
4 This builds on the notion that it is never optimal for a firm to issue new shares and pay dividends at
the same time, when the tax rate on dividends exceeds that on capital gains.
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It should also be clear from figure 1 that observed investment may not be useful to identify
the investment equation when financing constraints are relevant. Similarly, in a dynamic
specification of investment with binding financing constraints, the observed availability of internal
funds is no indicator for the relevance of financing constraints since firms that face especially strict
financing constraints may have a precautionary demand for internal funds.3
For these reasons, we adopt the approach proposed by Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen
(1988) to indirectly measure the importance of financing constraints in investment decisions for
the firms in our sample. This approach relies on a priori identification of the financing regime and
the expected sensitivity of investment to changes in internal funds (cash flow) per regime. As
argued above, investment of firms in financing regimes II and III is sensitive to changes in internal
funds. Investment of regime I firms is not. Therefore, if we identify a firm’s financing regime, we
can investigate the impact of changes in internal funds on investment to grasp the relevance of
financing constraints. We perform this identification along the lines of Fazzari, Hubbard and
Petersen (1988) and determine whether or not firms face financing constraints on the basis of
retention practice.4 Hence we regard firms that pay little or no dividends to face binding financing
constraints and to operate in either regime II or III. De Haan (1997) and Van Ees, Garretsen, De
5 In addition, one may want to argue that the steepness of the debt supply schedule also increases when
liquidation values fall. This would only reinforce our hypothesis.
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Haan and Sterken (1998) find that, for Dutch firms, retention practice effectively sorts out
financially constrained firms.
Furthermore, along the lines of Shleifer and Vishny (1992) we argue that a firm’s ability to
finance investment depends on the liquidation value of the investment outlays. Shleifer and Vishny
(1992) relate liquidation values to debt capacity. They show that higher liquidation costs reduce
debt capacity. This implies that firms which have the lowest ex ante liquidation costs are the firms
with the highest debt capacities since these firms can provide more valuable collateral to their
loans. In line with Hubbard (1998) we regard these collateralized loans to be a close substitute of
internal funds. In this regard, “Internal funds” in figure 1 now refers to both internal funds as well
as collateralized new debt. Similarly, “New debt” now refers exclusively to uncollateralized new
debt. For firms with low liquidation values of investments, therefore, the sum of internal funds and
collateralized debt, all else equal, is probably lower than for firms with high liquidation values of
investment.5 The former firms are thus more likely to engage in uncollateralized loans, i.e. operate
in regime II or even III. Hence, we expect these firms to exhibit a relatively higher sensitivity of
investment to changes in internal funds like cash flow. 
In the present setup of financing constraints, we have to consider the investment decision in
conjunction with the firm’s financing regime. For firms in the first financing regime, we expect the
investment equation to take the form of equation (8). In these circumstances investment is driven
solely by neo-classical fundamentals. For firms in regimes II and III, however, equation (8) does
not explain all aspects of the investment decision. For these firms, we have to augment the
6 Working capital is the sum of cash, short term claims and inventories less short term debt and hence
refers to a potential (temporary) source of internal funds the firm may wish to use for the financing of new
investment.
7 Furthermore, Fazzari and Petersen (1993) suggest that if working capital is excluded from the
empirical model cash flow sensitivities may be underestimated. 
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investment equation with a measure of changes in internal funds (cash flow). The remainder of this
section introduces two further variables that capture or are related to financing constraints.
 First, we implement the idea developed by Fazzari and Petersen (1993) that the impact of
working capital on investment also signals the relevance of financing constraints.6 Suppose, for
instance, that the positive cash flow sensitivity of investment is artificial and that it is simply the
result of unobserved changes in profitability of investment reflected in higher cash flow. If this
hypothesis is true, then all types of investment should go up simultaneously, including investment
in working capital. This translates into a positive expected coefficient on net working capital in the
investment equation. If, however, we want to maintain the assumption that cash flow measures the
size of the internal financial market, then the role of working capital is more that of a use of
(internal) funds. In that case investment in working capital competes with investment in fixed
assets for funds. Then we expect a negative coefficient on working capital in the investment
equation. A negative coefficient on working capital in the investment equation therefore signals
the relevance of financing constraints. It  also justifies the interpretation of cash flow sensitivity of
investment as stemming from financing constraints.7  Investment in working capital is therefore
added to the investment equation to provide additional insight into the relevance of financing
constraints. 
8 In addition, De Haan and Hinloopen (1999) p. 3, document that “the public capital market for
corporations is relatively thin, with a few large firms issuing stocks and bonds and the bulk of the firms using only
private loans (mostly bank loans) when external finance is required”.
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Second, we follow Weigand and Audretsch (1999) and add long term debt accumulation to
the investment equation as a proxy for the use of monitored capital. This line of reasoning stems
from the empirical focus of these authors on the German corporate sector, in which banks play an
important role in financing. The importance of German banks is reflected by the large share of long
term bank loans in total corporate German debt. Hence long term debt may proxy for the
monitoring intensity of banks. When firms are able to raise additional monitoring capital, we
expect the financing constraints to soften. This allows for investment increases. Therefore, we
expect long term debt accumulation to stimulate investment. In addition, Weigand and Audretsch
(1999) ague that the impact of a higher monitoring intensity is likely larger for constrained German
firms. In a study of financing constraints in the Dutch corporate sector, Van Ees and Garretsen
(1994) as well as De Haan (1997) find that for the Dutch business sector bank relations also play
an important role in the mitigation of financing constraints. Since the role of banks in Dutch and
German corporate financing is comparable, we also include long term debt accumulation in our
empirical investment equation.8
4 Estimation
We specify the empirical investment equation in line with the theoretical investment equation
represented by equation (8). Unfortunately, data limitations do not allow us to include either the
9 Regarding the impact of omission of the real rental price of capital Chirinko (1993) argues that price
variables are unimportant relative to quantity variables in investment equations and more importantly, their
omission does not lead to considerable changes in the other parameter estimates.
10 See for example Bond and Van Reenen (1999), p. 33, or Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988), p.
176.
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demand elasticity for firms’ output or the real rental price of capital. We assume that the impact of
these variables will be captured by time and firm fixed effects.9 Please note that dropping the rental
price of capital transforms our neo-classical specification of capital demand into a de facto
accelerator model.10 In addition, we add cash flow, working capital investment and long term debt
accumulation as additional variables to capture the impact of financing constraints. We estimate
the following model of investment:
. (9)I
A S
S
A
C F
A
W C
A
L T D
A
it
it
it
it
it
it
it
it
it
it
it
it
− − − − −
= + + + + +
1
1 2
1
3
1
4
1
5
1
β β β β β µ∆ ∆ ∆ln ln
In this equation the variables are indexed by firm (i) and year (t), I captures investment in fixed
assets, A measures total assets, S is sales, CF stands for cash flow, WC is working capital and LTD
measures long term debt. The exact definition of the variables follows in the next section.
Variables for which the natural logarithm is included in the regression model are preceded by ln
and  is the first difference operator. 
The theoretical specification of the investment function (equation 8) results in a negative
expected sign for  and a positive . For unconstrained firms, the two sales variables to whichβ1 β2
-15-
these parameters pertain are also expected to be sufficient statistic for the determination of
investment. The coefficient on cash flow, , is expected to be positive only when financingβ3
constraints matter, while this interpretation requires a negative parameter estimate for . Underβ4
the maintained hypothesis that long term debt proxies monitoring capital and in this manner
stimulates investment, the estimated coefficient on long term debt accumulation, , is positiveβ5
and likely stronger positive when financing constraints are more relevant.
We estimate equation (9) including firm specific effects to allow for unobserved
heterogeneity across firms and periods of time and possible bias due to the non-random nature of
the sample. This implies that
(10)µ α λ νit i t it= + +
where  captures the fixed firm-specific (time-invariant) effects,  captures the fixed time-α i λt
specific (firm-invariant) effects and  is a white noise error term.ν i t
We also recognize the potential endogeneity of investment in net working capital and long
term debt accumulation. We adopt a two-stage least squares approach (i.e. within 2SLS, see also
Baltagi, 1981) and instrument these variables with their lagged levels. The treatment of working
capital investment as potentially endogenous is straightforward. Investment in working capital and
fixed capital are both uses of funds. Therefore, investment in working capital is likely to be
simultaneously decided with investment in fixed assets. The treatment of long term debt
11 See for example Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988), Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1991),
Schaller (1993), Van Ees and Garretsen (1994), Vogt (1994) and Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995).
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accumulation as potentially endogenous reflects uncertainty regarding the direction of causation.
Increases in long term debt may facilitate investment by reducing financing constraints. In this
scenario, long term debt is an exogenous variable. However, it is also conceivable that long term
debt is increased when profitable investment opportunities emerge. Investment is then the trigger
for long term debt accumulation and the direction of causation is reversed (cf. Weigand and
Audretsch, 1999).
5 The data and the definition of splitting criteria
As argued before, the extent to which financial variables affect the investment decisions of firms
depends on the particular financing regime it operates in. Hence, we have to consider the
investment function for each financing regime individually. This leads to the well-accepted split-
sample analysis of investment equations in the field of research that addresses the importance of
financing constraints.11 The present section introduces the data used in the empirical analysis and
defines in detail the splitting criteria. We conclude with a statistical summary of the sample in total
and by sample split.
Sample selection
In the empirical analysis we make use of Statistics Netherlands’ SFGO sample, which collects
balance-sheet and income statement data on a nonrandom sample of Dutch firms. The sample is
12 More specifically, the sectors are Food and goodies (20/21), Textile (22), Clothing (23), Leather,
shoes and leatherware (24), Wood and furniture (25), Paper and related (26), Graphic industry and publishers (27),
Petroleum (28), Chemical (29), Synthetic strings and fibres (30), Rubber and synthetics processing (31), Building
materials, pottery, glass (32), Basic metal (33), Metal products (34), Machines (35), Electronics (36), Transports
(37), (Optical) instruments (38), Other (39).
13 The sectoral data can be found in “Samenvattend overzicht van de industrie, K-160”. Price
information is confidential.
-17-
devised to collect information on the entire population of Dutch firms for which the total balance
sheet length exceeds HFL 20 million in current prices. In practice, the annual response rate is
roughly eighty percent, so that the SFGO sample includes nearly 30,000 firm-years of observation.
The sample covers the period 1977-1997. We extract from this sample a balanced panel of Dutch
manufacturing firms, thus following the majority of papers in this field of research. Manufacturing
firms are identified according to SBI74 classification. At the two-digit SBI74 level, sectors 20 up
to and including 39 are included in the manufacturing sector.12 Due to attrition, we find it optimal
to select the years ranging from 1983 to 1996 so that we have information on all the relevant
variables for a total of 206 firms. We combine this information with sectoral data collected by
Statistics Netherlands, which contains industry sales and price indices at the two-digit level.13
Splitting criteria
We are interested in the role of financing constraints in different regimes of financing. To that end
we want to find out whether sensitivity of investment to changes in internal funds resembles the
shape of the supply of funds curve in figure 1. To construct our sample split criteria, we use
information for the period 1983-1991 to assess the probability that a firm operates in regime I or
14
 The data we analyse do not allow us to construct a medium retention class since less than 10 firms
would satisfy the usual criterion, i.e. making dividend payments of more than 10% but not exceeding 20% for at
least two out of every three sample years. Considering a wider medium class – dividend payments ranging from
10% to 25% and even 30% – did not solve this problem sufficiently.
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in one of the regimes II and III. For firms in financing regime I, financing constraints are not
expected to have a meaningful impact on the estimated investment equation. In regimes II and III
we do expect financial variables to significantly and positively impact on investment. The
remaining five years from 1992 to 1996 are then used to estimate the importance of financing
constraints in investment equations. We have chosen to split the sample this way to avoid that the
financing regime may be endogenously determined itself. 
Our first splitting criterion is based on retention practice, as in Fazzari, Hubbard and
Petersen (1988). Our classification scheme identifies only two retention classes (low and high) as
opposed to Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen who also identify a medium retention class.14 We
allocate firms to the high retention class when, in the period 1983-1991, the firm had a dividend
payout rate of less than ten percent in six years or more. The dividend payout rate is defined as
dividends over profits.
Not all companies in the sample have issued shares. When a firm has not yet issued any
shares it does not pay dividends. Our classification scheme automatically judges them to belong to
the high retention class. In fact, however, these are probably the firms that have always had
investment demand such as II or III. Therefore, we possibly classify these firms incorrectly to the
high retention class. We check for all the firms in the high retention class whether they had shares
outstanding during the entire 1983-1991 period. We find for five firms that they had no shares
15 See also Guiso and Parigi (199,9 p. 208, footnote 33).
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outstanding, all other firms issued their first shares prior to 1983. We marked the retention class as
missing value for the five former firms. Of the remaining 201 classifications, 82 are in the high
retention class and 119 are in the low retention class.
Our second splitting criterion is based on the liquidation value of investment.15 We construct
an indicator of asset liquidity based on industry comovement of sales. The idea builds on Shleifer
and Vishny (1992) to the extent that it attempts to capture the liquidation value of the firm. The
cost of liquidation depends on whom assets can be sold to when liquidation is required. Firms in
the same line of business are the next best users of the assets. Hence, the liquidation cost is lowest
when it is possible to sell the assets to a firm in the same business. If firm and industry sales are
highly correlated, which by definition implies a high degree of comovement, then the firm and
industry face declining demand at the same time. In such a case the liquidation value is expected to
be low. Since the other firms are likely to face difficulties in generating financial resources
themselves to purchase the second-hand capital assets of their competitors or find no interest in
expanding their business at that time, the probability that the firm sells its assets to a firm in the
same line of business decreases with the degree of comovement of the firm and industry sales. 
We use two measures of comovement for each firm. The first is the correlation of the
logarithms of the levels of firm and industry sales during the period 1983-1991. The second is the
correlation of the first differences in the logarithms of firm and industry sales during the period
1984-1991. Since our results below do not depend on the choice of these two ways of measuring
comovement we only report our results based on the second measure. The sector information
regarding (real) sales was obtained from Statistics Netherlands. This data contains information on
16 The correlation of the price indices of the individual sectors was nearly 90 percent in levels and 70
percent in first differences. Therefore, the loss in accuracy using the aggregate deflator is probably not large.
17 Our estimation results presented in the next section are not affected by excluding sectors 29 and 30.
To save space we do not report these.
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industry sales and price indices at the two-digit level sector level according to the SBI74
classification scheme. We could not compute this measure of comovement for firms in sectors 27
and 38 as price indices where not available for these sectors and hence sales could not be deflated.
Fourteen firms were in these two sectors. In addition, sales data were not available for sectors 20
and 21 separately, but only for both sectors  jointly. Therefore, we deflated these combined sector-
sales with the average price index of the two sectors and treated these two sectors as a single
one.16 For sectors 29 and 30 sales were likewise not reported for the sectors separately but only
for the two sectors jointly. Moreover, the price index for sector 30 was unavailable as well. Since
approximately ten percent of our sample consisted of firms in sector 29 (but none in sector 30),
we were reluctant to eliminate these observations. Instead, we deflated the combined sales of
sectors 29 and 30 with the price index for sector 29.17
Comovement is a continuous variable rather than the discrete classification of retention
practices. For each individual firm, however, it is a constant. Comovement varies from -0.90 to
0.92. The 25th percentile, median and 75th percentile are -0.21, 0.11 and 0.36, respectively. The
mean value is 0.07. We consider comovement to be low when the correlation between firm and
industry sales is lower than 0.11 (the median). Comovement is medium if it is in between 0.11 and
0.36 (the third quartile), and it is high when the correlation exceeds 0.36. The classification is
admittedly ad hoc. However, the results presented in the next section reveal that meaningful
18 This is different from the findings of Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988). For their sample of
Value Line firms, they find that high retention firms have the highest investment rates and the fastest sales growth
rates. Their sample consisted of young firms, however, whereas our sample is constructed from a data base of large
and mature firms.
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differences exist between these three groups (in terms of both descriptive statistics as well as
regression results), while further subdivision of the low comovement group does not generate new
insights regarding investment behaviour of these firms. 
Descriptive statistics by sample split and in total
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the firms in our sample. Mean, standard error, median
and number of firms are reported for the full sample and by sample split. We describe the sample
and sub-samples by investment, sales, long term debt, working capital and cash flow
characteristics. Investment is defined as changes in tangible fixed assets due to purchase or
production. Working capital measures the sum of cash, inventories and short term claims less short
term debt. Cash flow is defined as earnings after interest and taxes, but before depreciation and
dividends.
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
Columns 2 and 3 show the differences between low and high retention firms in terms of
financial characteristics. High retention firms invest slightly less, have a lower level of sales and, on
average, their sales grew at a slower rate.18 High retention firms also have slightly lower levels of
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working capital, although the annual investment in working capital is comparable to that of low
retention firms. The most important difference between the two classes of firms is in terms of debt
rates and debt accumulation. High retention firms have a considerably larger debt burden, but at
the same time are hardly accumulating any new debt. Hence the selection on the basis of retention
is likely to identify correctly the firms operating in regimes II and especially III. Finally, high
retention firms have larger cash flow ratios than low retention firms.
Columns 4, 5, and 6 present financial characteristics for the sub-samples of firms with low,
medium, or high comovement. From these columns it is clear that the financial characteristics of
firms also differ when we rank them by comovement. The pattern is not monotonic in most cases,
however. Investment is roughly equal for low and medium comovement firms, but considerably
lower for high comovement firms. Our explanation for this observation is that firms in the high
comovement industries find it harder to attract external financial resources to fund such investment
because of low liquidation values as we explained before. Sales level, working capital ratio and
investment in working capital are similar for high and low comovement firms but lower for
medium comovement firms. Medium comovement firms exhibit the fastest sales growth rates.
Cash flow is almost identical on average across the three sub-samples. Again, the most important
observations relate to debt rates and accumulation. The relative debt level for low and medium
comovement firms is roughly equal. For high comovement firms, however, it is lower. In addition,
average debt accumulation falls monotonically when comovement increases. This is in line with
our expectations again, since a higher degree of comovement makes it more difficult to attract
external financial resources due to a lack of potential collateral that firms can offer to external
providers of finance.
19 The strength of our instruments was tested for in all regression equations reported in tables 2 and 3.
The joint significance of the instruments in the first stages exceeded the critical F-value advised by Staiger and
Stock (1997) by a fair margin.
20 Among the studies that employ split sample analysis of reduced form investment equations, Oliner
and Rudebusch (1992), Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995) and Hsiao and Tahmiscioglu (1997) find insignificant
cash flow impact on investment. In all three cases these findings refer to the sub sample of a priori unconstrained
firms. Whited (1992) presents similar findings in a split sample analysis of Euler equations.
-23-
6 Results
Full sample results: 1992-1996
Table 2 presents regression results of the determinants of investment for the full sample for the
period 1992-1996.19 We focus first on the second column where results are presented using all 206
firms in the sample. The coefficients on the sales terms have the expected signs and are highly
significant. Annual sales growth enters with a negative sign and the sales to assets ratio contributes
positively to investment. Surprisingly, there is no statistically discernible impact of cash flow on
investment. The point estimate is positive, but small and barely exceeds the standard error. Few
other studies find that cash flow has no impact on investment and the studies that do usually derive
those results from the subsample of a priori unconstrained firms.20 While this indicates absence of
binding financing constraints for the full sample, the estimated signs and significance of working
capital investment and long term debt accumulation suggest otherwise. Working capital has a
negative and significant impact on investment, indicating that working capital and fixed asset
21 The magnitude of the parameter estimate is much lower than presented in Fazzari and Petersen
(1993). In fact, our estimate does not exceed -0.10 while theirs (in a q-model) it is -0.18 for a priori unconstrained
firms and -0.43 for a priori constrained firms. For regressions including sales, they find a working capital impact of
-0.22, still twice as large as our estimate. Our findings are more in line with those presented by Weigand and
Audretsch (1999), who find a working capital impact on investment of -0.12.
22 The impact of long term debt on investment corresponds in magnitude with findings presented by
Fazzari and Petersen (1993) as well as Weigand and Audretsch (1999).
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investment compete for a limited pool of funds.21 Endogenous long term debt accumulation
stimulates investment, suggesting that debt acquisition ameliorates financing constraints.22
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE
As explained before, the construction of sample splitting criteria results in the loss of
observations. In particular, we have no information regarding retention class for five firms and no
indication of comovement for another fourteen firms. Splitting the sample may generate different
cash flow sensitivities due to sample selection rather than binding financing constraints. On the
other hand, deleting these observations from further analysis would result in loss of nearly ten
percent of our sample. As a middle way, we run the investment regression on three sub-samples of
data as well (columns 3, 4 and 5), covering the instances in which we have no information
regarding retention class and/or comovement. The stability of parameter estimates across these
three alternative samples suggests that the eliminated observations do not contain any other
information than that reflected in the original estimates. In other words, our results here and those
presented in the next section are not likely to be driven by such sample selection issues.
23 Their sample is a panel of 76 Dutch non-financial firms that were listed on the Amsterdam Stock
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Split sample analysis
Table 3 presents regression results for investment equations of firms where the sample is uni-
variately split according to retention practice and comovement classes. Columns 2 and 3 contrast
low and high retention class firms. As explained before, high retention firms are likely those firms
that have a high probability of operating in financing regimes II or III. They are therefore a priori
(more) constrained than low retention firms. We find that low and high retention class firms do not
differ in responsiveness to the sales-to-assets ratio or sales growth. The differences between the
two classes of firms lie entirely with those variables we associate with the presence of financing
constraints. In particular, cash flow, working capital investment and debt accumulation are
insignificant at the five percent level for low retention firms. The coefficient on cash flow even
takes on a negative value. For high retention firms, on the other hand, these three variables have
signs that suggest that financing constraints matter and additionally, all are significant at the five
percent level or better. These results are in line with many studies reporting on the relevance of
financing constraints using retention practice as a sorting device (Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen
(1988), Fazzari and Petersen (1993), Vogt (1994), Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995)). At the same
time, however, our finding contrast sharply to the one study that uses a comparable set of data.
Van Ees and Garretsen (1994) report that financing constraints matter in Dutch corporate
investment, but retention practice does not effectively discriminate between constrained and
unconstrained firms. Unfortunately, the study does not report the estimation results of this exercise
so that we cannot compare the magnitude of our estimates (which are quit low in absolute terms
by international standards, we return to this issue at the end of this section) with theirs.23
Exchange in the years 1984-1990. Estimation results are derived for the period 1985-1990. The methodological
differences between their research and ours are the following. First, we select manufacturing firms, which is only a
subsample of all non-financial firms. Second, we derive results from the years 1992-1996, not 1985-1990. Third
and most important, we construct our sample splitting criteria using the years 1983-1991 and subsequently analyse
financing constraints out-of-sample, whereas Van Ees and Garretsen (1994) construct these splits from the same
data they analyse investment equations from.
24 We have also estimated equation (9) using bivariate splits by subdividing the low and high retention
classes into low, medium and high comovement. To save space we do not report these results. Furthermore, due to
-26-
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE
In columns 4, 5 and 6 regressions results are presented where the sample is split according
to sales comovement into low, medium and high comovement. Comparing low and high
comovement firms, we find that sales matter little for the latter class of firms. Regarding the
variables signalling the presence of financing constraints, working capital investment is negative
and statistically discernible for the low comovement firms, but both cash flow and debt
accumulation are indiscernible from zero. For the high comovement firms, however, working
capital investment is more negative and cash flow and debt accumulation are positive and
significantly so at conventional levels. It should be noted, however, that the changes in parameter
estimates are not monotonic across comovement classes for most variables. The parameter
estimates for cash flow and debt accumulation are the only two that increase monotonically when
comovement increases. The effect of working capital investment is larger for high comovement
firms than for low comovement firms, yet the difference is not statistically significant and the
coefficient peaks low for the medium comovement firms.24
the relatively small samples that resulted from this subdivision, many of the parameters were found to be
statistically insignificant. One result we found was that for the low retention class firms, the cash flow sensitivity of
investment increases across comovement classes.
25 A possible explanation is the following. In a q-approach as well as a sales accelerator model, we
would expect financial variables to be irrelevant in the investment decision of unconstrained firms. The only factor
that should determine investment is the expected profitability of the investment. The technical complications in
measuring q and the potential for mismeasurement might lead to a relatively large informational content of cash
flow regarding expected investment profitability. In a sales accelerator model, the potential for mismeasurement is
much lower, so that cash flow has a much lower probability to convey additional information concerning
profitability that is not already embodied in sales information.
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Overall, we find that financing constraints matter in Dutch corporate investment in
manufacturing firms and can be identified using both retention and firm-industry sales comovement
discrimination. At the same time, however, our estimation results regarding cash flow sensitivities
show relatively small absolute cash flow impact on investment. In comparison, Fazzari, Hubbard
and Petersen (1988) find a cash flow impact on investment ranging from well over 0.20 for
unconstrained firms to as high as 0.50 for constrained firms. We want to discuss two factors that
we think contribute to these differences. First, we estimate a sales accelerator model and this
generally produces lower cash flow estimates than a q-approach. In fact, Fazzari, Hubbard and
Petersen (1988) consider a sales accelerator model as an alternative specification of investment
and see their cash flow sensitivities of investment drop by as much as 50%.25 Second, the data we
use may be biased against finding relevant financing constraints. We restrict our international
comparison here to the study by Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) who base their findings on
a sample of Value Line firms. The structure of these data is such that it includes young firms that
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are not at all well-known to the public for the main part of the sample period. In other words,
firms in their sample are likely to be exactly the firms that face binding financing constraints due to
information problems. In contrast, our sample consists of the largest Dutch firms that belonged to
the group of largest Dutch firms from the start of the sample period. These are firms that may face
a lower degree of financing constraints simply because they may have overcome information
problems to a certain extent and are well-known by the public.
7 Conclusion
Financing constraints matter in the investment decisions of 206 of the largest and probably most
mature Dutch manufacturing firms. This is the conclusion from our split-sample analysis of
reduced form investment equations. The investment function of a priori constrained firms is
materially different from the investment function of an a priori unconstrained firm. More
specifically, in the latter case investment can be meaningfully characterized using a simple sales
accelerator approach. Working capital investment and long term debt accumulation weakly impact
on investment in this situation. For a priori constrained firms, however, sales accelerator
arguments reflect only part of the investment decision. For these firms, cash flow and long term
debt accumulation are systematically and positively related to investment while working capital
investment competes with investment in fixed assets for a limited pool of finance. This
corroborates with an explanation based on capital market imperfections such that firms abide by a
financing hierarchy.
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We also show that financing constraints are associated with firm-specific factors as well as
aspects of the economic environment the firm operates in. In particular, our results indicate that
financing constraints are binding for firms that follow a high retention practice. This finding
suggests that firms have investment opportunities that cannot be profitably deployed using external
funds, but are profitable when internal funds are available. Additionally, investments with low
liquidation value appear more difficult to finance with external funds than investments with a high
liquidation value. This finding suggests that there may be investments that cannot be financed with
external funds due to lack of collateral (the result of low liquidation value) but can be profitably
financed when internal funds are available.
Interestingly, the estimation results clearly demonstrate that for the a priori unconstrained
firms cash flow, working capital investment and long term debt accumulation have a limited
impact at best. We propose the sales accelerator specification of the investment function as a
partial explanation, but consider the particular features of our sample (consisting of large, mature
and well-known firms) to contribute mostly to this finding. The fact that we find evidence of
financing constraints in this particular sample suggests at least that our findings provide a lower
bound for the relevance of financing constraints in the Dutch business sector at large. Young,
small firms that are not yet well-known to the public are likely to face stricter financing constraints
as their risk premium on debt and lemon’s premium on equity additionally reflects lack of
information regarding structural behaviour and performance.
Finally, we think it is appropriate to mention the link between sales comovement and
investment irreversibilities. If sales comovement proxies the liquidation value of investment, then
we can also interpret it as a proxy of the irreversibility of investment. Higher sales comovement
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indicates a lower degree of reversibility in this respect. If this line of reasoning is correct, however,
we have to take into account that a higher sales comovement may not only affect investment
through the reduced ability to acquire external funds. In addition, then, higher sales comovement,
all else equal, may also reduce the incentive to invest. This is a well-known conclusion from the
real options literature (see Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). We did not consider this secondary impact of
sales comovement on financing constraints in this paper, but leave it as a direction for further
research.
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Table 1
Summary statistics: sample of manufacturing firms, 1983-1991
All
Firms
Retention classa Comovementb
Low High Low Medium High
Investment to assets
lnSales
lnSalesc
lnSales to assets
Working capital to assets
Working capital to assetsc
Long term debt to assets
Long term debt to assetsc
Cash flow to assets
N
0.082
(0.002)
[0.064]
12.348
(0.029)
[12.153]
0.049
(0.005)
[0.049]
0.310
(0.013)
[0.365]
0.174
(0.004)
[0.160]
0.011
(0.002)
[0.012]
0.125
(0.003)
[0.087]
0.006
(0.003)
[0.000]
0.061
(0.003)
[0.078]
206
0.084
(0.002)
[0.066]
12.489
(0.037)
[12.316]
0.052
(0.006)
[0.051]
0.308
(0.014)
[0.345]
0.178
(0.005)
[0.167]
0.011
(0.003)
[0.014]
0.093
(0.003)
[0.060]
0.010
(0.004)
[0.000]
0.053
(0.004)
[0.073]
119
0.079
(0.003)
[0.058]
12.067
(0.046)
[11.873]
0.046
(0.010)
[0.049]
0.294
(0.023)
[0.398]
0.169
(0.008)
[0.148]
0.012
(0.004)
[0.012]
0.170
(0.006)
[0.130]
0.002
(0.004)
[0.000]
0.071
(0.005)
[0.092]
82
0.085
(0.003)
[0.068]
12.414
(0.039)
[12.267]
0.049
(0.008)
[0.050]
0.359
(0.018)
[0.390]
0.185
(0.006)
[0.182]
0.011
(0.003)
[0.013]
0.127
(0.005)
[0.083]
0.010
(0.005)
[-0.000]
0.058
(0.004)
[0.080]
96
0.086
(0.004)
[0.057]
12.045
(0.060)
[11.804]
0.060
(0.010)
[0.048]
0.156
(0.027)
[0.268]
0.165
(0.010)
[0.133]
0.007
(0.005)
[0.009]
0.132
(0.007)
[0.086]
0.007
(0.004)
[0.000]
0.061
(0.007)
[0.073]
48
0.071
(0.003)
[0.054]
12.570
(0.066)
[12.245]
0.037
(0.011)
[0.046]
0.409
(0.029)
[0.475]
0.186
(0.008)
[0.167]
0.014
(0.005)
[0.013]
0.116
(0.006)
[0.083]
0.001
(0.003)
[0.000]
0.058
(0.006)
[0.068]
48
Notes: Variable means are reported, standard error is in parenthesis, median in square brackets.
a Based on dividend payout. A firm is in the high retention class when the dividend payout rate does not
exceed 10 percent for six years or more. A firm is in the low retention class otherwise.
b Comovement is low when the correlation between firm and industry sales is 0.106 or lower (the median).
Comovement is medium when this correlation is in between 0.106 and 0.363 (which captures the third
quartile) and it is high when the correlation exceeds 0.363.
 c Annual change in relevant variable.
Table 2
The determinants of investment: full sample, 1992-1996 
Independent variablesa All observations Excluding
missing
comovement
Excluding
missing
retention class
Excluding
missing
retention class
and/or missing
comovement
lnSales
lnSales to assets
Cash flow to assets
Working capital to assetsb
Long term debt to assetsb
N
-0.029
(0.010)
0.059
(0.010)
0.018
(0.015)
-0.099
(0.032)
0.170
(0.045)
206
-0.031
(0.010)
0.059
(0.010)
0.016
(0.016)
-0.097
(0.034)
0.169
(0.049)
192
-0.028
(0.010)
0.059
(0.010)
0.016
(0.015)
-0.091
(0.032)
0.165
(0.045)
201
-0.030
(0.010)
0.058
(0.010)
0.014
(0.016)
-0.089
(0.034)
0.164
(0.049)
187
 Notes: Within-2SLS estimates of investment equation. Dependent variable is changes in tangible fixed assets
due to purchase or production over total assets. Standard error in parentheses.
a lnsales is the first difference of the natural logarithm of total sales, lnsales to assets is the log of sales
less the log of total assets, cash flow to assets is earnings after interest and taxes, but before depreciation
and dividends over total assets, net working capital to assets is the first difference of net working capital
to total assets (where net working capital is defined as the sum of cash, inventories and short term claims
less short term debt),  long term debt to assets is the first difference of long term debt over total assets.
b Variables are treated as potentially endogenous and are instrumented with their lagged levels.
Table 3
The impact of cash flow on investment: uni-variate sample splits, 1992-1996
Independent variablesa Retention classb Comovementc
Low High Low Medium High
lnSales
lnSales to assets
Cash flow to assets
Working capital to assetsd
Long term debt to assetsd
N
-0.029
(0.013)
0.060
(0.015)
-0.029
(0.019)
-0.052
(0.034)
0.100
(0.059)
119
-0.024
(0.015)
0.057
(0.014)
0.079
(0.032)
-0.157
(0.064)
0.256
(0.069)
82
-0.025
(0.017)
0.083
(0.019)
-0.011
(0.025)
-0.110
(0.048)
0.151
(0.080)
96
-0.083
(0.027)
0.071
(0.020)
0.014
(0.032)
-0.039
(0.072)
0.191
(0.078)
48
-0.032
(0.017)
0.023
(0.013)
0.063
(0.031)
-0.156
(0.069)
0.304
(0.138)
48
Notes: Within-2SLS estimates of investment equation. Dependent variable is changes in tangible fixed assets due
to purchase or production over total assets. Standard error in parentheses.
a lnsales is the first difference of the natural logarithm of total sales, lnsales to assets is the log of sales
less the log of total assets, cash flow to assets is earnings after interest and taxes, but before depreciation
and dividends over total assets, net working capital to assets is the first difference of net working capital
to total assets (where net working capital is defined as the sum of cash, inventories and short term claims
less short term debt),  long term debt to assets is the first difference of long term debt over total assets.
b Based on dividend payout. A firm is in the high retention class when the dividend payout rate does not
exceed 10 percent for six years or more. A firm is in the low retention class otherwise.
c Comovement is low when the correlation between firm and industry sales is 0.106 or lower (the median).
Comovement is medium when this correlation is in between 0.106 and 0.363 (which captures the third
quartile) and it is high when the correlation exceeds 0.363.
d Variables are treated as potentially endogenous and are instrumented with their lagged levels.
Figure 1
Financing constraints and regimes
